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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines daily open-to-close returns from three major stock 
markets over the past five years including the October 1987 Stock Market 
Crash. We find some evidence that volatility spillover effects emanating 
from Japan have been gathering strength over time, especially after the 
1987 Crash. This may be attributed to a growing awareness of domestic 
investors about the economic interdependence of international financial 
markets. 
1. Introduction 
The October 19, 1987 stock market Crash is noteworthy not only for the severity 
of its impact on the U.S. market, but also for the pervasiveness of its impact 
throughout the world's stock markets. Prior to the Crash, the correlation in 
returns across international stock markets in high-frequency data was found to 
be weak and difficult to detect above the normal noise associated with domestic 
trading. However, around the time of the Crash a strong correlation was 
exhibited across markets. This strong interdependence among financial markets 
could have fundamentally altered investor perceptions concerning the importance 
of foreign financial news, thereby permanently increasing the correlation in 
stock returns and volatility across markets. 
Numerous studies have examined various aspects of the 1987 Crash.2 Roll (1988) 
offers a comprehensive analysis of the international transmission of the 1987 
Crash across all major world stock markets. King-Wadhwani (1990) examine an 
eight month period surrounding the 1987 Crash and document a "contagion" effect 
where a "mistake" in one market such as the Crash is transmitted to other 
markets. They also show increased correlation between markets just after the 
Crash. Neumark-Tinsley-Tosini (1988) study U.S. stocks that are dually listed 
in Tokyo or London. Previous overnight price change in Tokyo or London is used 
to predict New York price movements. They find significantly increased 
predictability after the Crash for a one month period. Both von Furstenberg-Jeon 
(1989) and Rogers (1990) hypothesize that a structural shift in relations among 
1 We thank participants of the conference "Statistical Models for Financial 
Volatility" at the University of California, San Diego for their useful comments. 
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 See Roll (1989) for an extensive review of this literature. 
1 
international stock returns occurs following the Crash. 
Several recent papers have explored possible spillover effects across 
international financial markets. Ito-Roley (1987) investigate the effect of 
actual news announcements on the volatility of yen/dollar exchange rate in 
various geographic segments of the market around the clock. They find that the 
U.S. money supply announcement surprises have the most consistent effects on 
exchange rate volatility. Bailey (1990) examines the effect of U.S. money supply 
announcements on Pacific Rim stock indexes and reports that a number of these 
stock markets exhibit price reactions similar to reactions observed in New York. 
He finds that the differential sensitivity of this news across these markets can 
be partially explained by the degree of international capital flow restrictions 
that exist in these capital markets. 
Engle-Ito-Lin (1990) examine intra-day foreign exchange rates in New York and 
Tokyo and find volatility spillover effects using a GARCH model. Ng-Chang-Chou 
(1991) present evidence on the extent of transmission of price volatility from 
the U.S. stock market to various Pacific Rim stock markets and the importance of 
government regulation of capital flows. Hamao-Masulis-Ng (1990) explore price 
change and volatility spillovers across Tokyo, London, and New York stock markets 
using a GARCH-M model. They report that over the pre-Crash period the 
transmission process of volatility across these markets differs in its impacts 
on domestic stock exchanges; while the Japanese market appears most sensitive to 
foreign volatility shocks, other markets, particularly the U.S. market is 
relatively insensitive to foreign (especially Japanese) volatility surprises. 
Over the last two years, the international stock markets have exhibited several 
interesting phenomena, including the "mini-crash of October 1989, the sustained 
period of stock price rises in Japan followed by the recent severe price drops 
and high volatility observed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange. These events have 
further increased interest in comovements of prices across international stock 
markets, as is illustrated by the following quotes in the business press: 
"On January 12, a 666-point plunge in Tokyo's key Nikkei average kicked 
off a 71-point sell-off in the Dow-Jones industrials. A few weeks later, 
a 600-point plunge in Japan sent the Dow tumbling 60 points in the first 
half-hour of trading. They used to say that when the U.S. sneezes, the 
rest of the world catches pneumonia. No more. Japan's awesome financial 
and economic muscle has reached the point where its kushami, or "sneezes," 
can make Wall Street sick." ("When Japan Gets the Jitters, the Rest of the 
World Trembles," Business Week, February 12, 1990). 
"Many of the people who thought Japan's stock market was stupendously 
overpriced worried that the bubble's inevitable burst would set of a chain 
reaction of stock market plunges around the globe. So far, there is no 
sign of that doomsday link. While the Tokyo stock market is down 14.37% 
—this year,—grn^V marlcp.r- elsewhere in the world haven't fallen as steeply 
and don't seem to be following the Nippon lead." ("So Far, Tokyo Isn't 
Dragging Rest of World Markets Down," Wall Street Journal, February 27, 
1990). 
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These two contradictory perspectives highlight the current controversy concerning 
the strength of international financial integration and its impacts on the 
relations among major stock markets. 
This paper studies the price processes and the relations of the world's largest 
stock exchanges over the last five years. The purpose of this study is to 
explore whether there are significant shifts in the stock return generating 
processes and the importance of volatility spillovers from foreign markets 
preceding and following the October 1987 Stock Market Crash. We use a 
modification of the GARCH return generating process for measuring structural 
shifts in this process at and around the 1987 Crash. The normalized residuals 
from some of our models exhibit high kurtosis compared to a normal distribution. 
Leptokurtosis generally causes the estimated standard errors to be unreliable 
which invalidates conventional statistical inference using t-tests. Therefore, 
we also use robust standard error based on the quasi maximum likelihood approach 
developed by Wooldridge (1988, 1990) and Bollerslev-Wooldridge (1990) to compute 
t-values. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the stock price data and 
is followed by Section 3 which reviews the basic ARCH framework and the 
particular modifications that we employ. Section 4 presents initial estimates 
of the GARCH model and then presents estimates of volatility spillover effects 
in intraday returns among the three international stock markets using a GARCH-M 
framework. Section 5 presents estimates of the structural changes in spillover 
effects at and around the 1987 Crash. Evidence of non-Crash related time trends 
in these spillover effects is presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
2. Data 
Our database covers the five year period, April 1, 1985 to February 28, 1990 and 
encompasses daily open and closing prices of major market indices on the Tokyo, 
London and New York stock exchanges.3 For the Tokyo Stock Exchange, we use the 
Nikkei 225 Stock Index, which is a price-weighted average stock price index. 
Opening price data were recorded at 9:15 am until December 18, 1987 and at 9:01 
am thereafter, while closing prices are recorded at 3:00 pm Tokyo time. The 
price data were obtained from Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha. There are several 
peculiarities about the Tokyo market. First, no trading takes place between 
11:00 am and 1:00 pm local time. Second, there was Saturday morning trading 
three times (or later twice) a month through January 1989. Third, there are 
price limits on individual stocks though they only apply for extremely large 
price changes. 
In the London stock market, we use the Financial Times-Stock Exchange 100 Share 
(FTSE) Index which is a value weighted index. The opening price data were 
recorded at 9:00 am, while the official closing price was at 3:30 pm London time. 
-While—the—actual clns_e_of the London market is at 5:00 Dm. to minimize the 
3
 These indices do not include dividend reinvestment which causes a small 
negative bias in the size of these recorded returns. 
i 
overlap in trading periods with New York to one hour, we use the earlier official 
close used for U.K. tax purposes. The data source was the London International 
Stock Exchange and the London Financial Times.* 
In the New York stock market, we use the Standard & Poor's 500 Composite Index. 
The S&P 500 is an equity value weighted arithmetic index. The primary data 
source was S&P's monthly "500 Information Bulletin." The opening stock price was 
measured at 10:01 am until September 30, 1985 and at 9:31 am thereafter and the 
close is at 4:00 pm EST. 
Figure 1 shows trading hours of the three exchanges in Eastern Standard Time. 
Figure 1 
Exchange Trading Hours 
London Stock Exchange 
^ • 
Tokyo Stock Exchange 
-^ • 
Few York Stock Exchange 
^ • 
From these daily opening and closing prices, we compute daily open-to-close 
returns for our three stock indices. By studying open-to-close returns, we can 
focus our analysis on periods when trading is actively taking place (which is 
when most information appears to be released to the market) and which has the 
advantage of representing periods of non-contemporaneous trading on our three 
stock exchanges.5 While London stock market prices are based on the average of 
the bid and ask quotes which must be available from 9:00 am to 5:00 pm local 
time, in New York and Tokyo only transaction prices are used and markets can 
frequently experience delayed openings of individual stocks. When delays of the 
A
 Unfort^nqt-oly, nn nrmh^r 16, 1987 the United Kingdom experienced a severe 
hurricane which caused the London market to remain closed for the day. 
5
 The one exception to this statement is the last hour of trading on the 
London Stock Exchange represents the first hour of trading in New York. 
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open occur, the Nikkei 225 and the S&P 500 indices use the prior day's closing 
price as a substitute for the unavailable opening price. This procedure 
introduces some artificial effects (e.g., serial correlation) in the open-to-
close and close-to-open returns of the New York and Tokyo stock indices.6 
Figure 2 depicts the difference between daily high and low prices divided by the 
average of high and low of the day for the period surrounding the 1987 Crash. 
It is clear from the figure that volatility rises at the time of the Crash and 
persists for a prolonged period thereafter for all of the three markets. 
Figure 2 
3. Application of the ARCH Framework to Intraday Stock Returns 
To evaluate the interrelations of price movements among major international stock 
markets, we utilize variants of the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) model developed by Engle (1982) and extended by Bollerslev (1986, 1987), 
and Engle-Lilien-Robins (1987).7 In this framework, the conditional variance, 
6
 This is n^t a gor-innc p-rnhl f>m for the Nikkei prior to December 18, 1987 
since we are using prices fifteen minutes after the market opens. 
7
 For a survey of the literature on applications of ARCH in finance, see 
Bollerslev-Chou-Kroner (1990). 
5 
h, is assumed to be a linear function of past squared errors as well as possible 
exogenous variables. This feature captures the observed serial correlation of 
second, moments that stock returns typically manifest and is consistent with the 
leptokurtic frequency distributions that stock return time series exhibit. 
We begin by specifying a GARCH-M model with weekend/holiday dummy variables in 
both the conditional mean and variance equations to capture not only the negative 
Monday effect in mean returns but also Monday's higher volatility as found, in 
Gibbons-Hess (1981) and Keim-Stambaugh (1984). Following earlier studies that 
document serial correlations in daily returns, we adjust the conditional mean 
return for a first order moving average process in an effort to insure the serial 
independence of the conditional error.8 The resulting GARCH(1,1)-M model is 
specified, below: 
where a > 0 , b, c > 0, ht is conditional variance of the error term et, and 
Wt is a weekend/holiday dummy variable which equals one on a day following a 
weekend, or holidays and zero otherwise. 
4. Spillover Effects Under a GARCH Model 
The results of estimating this GARCH model for our three stock exchanges using 
daily open-to-close returns for the full sample period are presented in Table 1. 
The formulation assumes that there are no structural shifts or nonstationarities 
across the estimation period and in particular that the return generating process 
is not altered around the October 1987 Crash. In all three markets, the GARCH 
parameters (b and c) are highly significant and these two parameter estimates sum 
to values between .9 and .92. On the other hand, the GARCH-M parameter estimate 
(/?) is insignificant, or if marginally significant, it can take on either a 
positive or negative sign. The diagnostic statistics for skewness and serial 
correlations of residuals and residuals squared all appear to indicate that the 
model is successful in characterizing the returns data in these markets. On the 
other hand, the coefficients of kurtosis display somewhat high values relative 
to a normal distribution, indicating that conventional t-values used to evaluate 
parameter estimates may be misstated. In order to cope with this problem, we 
present robust t-statistics in the third column for each market. 
The significance of the conditional variance parameter estimate in the mean 
equation is a controversial issue as the contradictory evidence and conclusions 
of Akgiray (1989) and French-Schwert-Stambaugh (1987) indicate. We present new 
—ftvidencp on rbls i.qqtie by estimating this parameter in our model and find that 
8
 This specification is based on the earlier results of Hamao-Masulis-Ng 
(1990). 
the GARCH model is a more persuasive characterization of our data than the GARCH-
M model. We also find that the weekend/holiday dummy variable in the mean 
equation has a negative parameter value in all these markets, though it is not 
statistically significant for the U.S. market. On the other hand, the 
weekend/holiday variable in the conditional variance equation has a significant 
negative parameter value in the U.S., and an insignificant value in other two 
markets. 
We next modify model (1) to include a volatility spillover effect from both 
foreign markets trading while the domestic market was closed. The expanded model 
is specified below: 
Rt - o + £ht+ «Wt + y(t_x + «t 
(2) , 
\ ' «t+ bht-l + C£t-1 + dWt + "it + pX2t ' 
where Xit is the most recent residual squared estimated from model (1) in foreign 
market i. Xit can be interpreted as the most recent volatility "surprise" 
realized in the foreign market while the domestic market is closed. Throughout 
the analysis, whenever the foreign market is closed for a holiday while the 
domestic market is open, we use the prior day's squared residual in the foreign 
market to estimate the spillover effect. 
Table 2 shows the results of applying model (2) to intraday returns on the three 
exchanges over the full sample period. This model implicitly assumes that there 
is no structural change over the sample period including the period subsequent 
to the October 1987 Crash. Consistent with the results of Hamao-Masulis-Ng 
(1990) , significant spillover effects from both foreign markets onto each of the 
three domestic markets are observed. It is also interesting to observe the 
substantial drop in the persistence parameters in the conditional variance, 
especially for the U.S. market. Further, much of the leptokurtosis evident in 
Table 1 is eliminated by allowing cross market spillover effects. The Ljung-Box 
statistics also indicate no significant serial correlation in residuals or 
squared residuals of the model for any the three markets. 
Figure 3 visualizes the extent of volatility spillover effects around the Crash. 
The figure presents the natural logs of the conditional variances (ht) estimated 
from model (1). A jump in the U.S. conditional variance is followed by an even 
larger reaction in the Japanese market and an increase in the U.K. market as 
well. The persistence of the increased level of volatility in the three 
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5. Estimates of Structural Changes in Spillover Effects 
The model we use to estimate potential shifts in these spillover relations 
involves two step functions representing the Crash (the month of October 1987) 
and post Crash (from November 1987 to February 1990) subperiods, which allow for 
shifts in the impacts of the foreign volatility surprises. This expanded model 
is described below: 
Rt - « + /3ht+ 5Wt + 7 ^ + «t 
ht - at+ bht_x + c e ^ + dWt + (f + gDt + k A ^ X ^ 
+ (p + qDt + r A t ) x 2 t 
where Dt equals one if t is in October 1987 (during the Crash month) and zero 
otherwise, and At equals one if t is in the post-Crash period (November 1987-
February 1990) and zero otherwise. Modifying the model as described in (3) 
enables us to examine not only the significance of volatility spillover effects, 
but also the extent of discrete shifts in the levels of these effects across the 
three subperiods. As such, this evidence can be interpreted as a robustness test 
of the stationary model described by (2). 
The results of estimating model (3) are presented in Table 3. Overall, the 
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diagnostic statistics do not indicate model misspecification. The Ljung-Box 
statistics are not significant and importantly the measures of kurtosis do not 
appear to be particularly leptokurtic relative to a normal distribution. This 
suggests that the conventional t-statistics are likely to be valid, especially 
once it is recognized that the sample period was chosen precisely because a large 
set of abnormal price changes were known to occur. 
The spillover effect from the U.S. market to Japan is significant before the 
Crash, but does not change significantly during the Crash month or thereafter. 
This pattern can also be discerned from Figure 4, which shows the response of the 
Japanese market to U.S. price volatility shocks. This figure is obtained by 
recursively solving the variance equation in model (3) . The impulse response to 
foreign market i is given by coefficients on Xit, Xit_lt ..., holding the effect 
of the other foreign market (Xj. terms) constant. 
Figure 4 
Impulse Response Function 
From U.S. to Japan 
The volatility spillover effect from the U.K. onto the Japanese market is 
significant before October 1987, exhibits no significant change in October 1987, 
and shows a decrease in spillover level after the Crash. The post-Crash level, 
defined by the sum of parameters f and k is 0.032. This is approximately one-
9 
third the pre-Crash level, 0.090.9 
Looking at the volatility spillover experienced in the U.K. market, we find that 
the Japanese market's influence is significant before October 1987, but there is 
no evidence of a significant change during the Crash month or afterwards. On the 
other hand, we find that the U.S. market's influence on U.K. price volatility to 
be insignificant before, during, and after the Crash month. This may be due to 
the fact that U.S. market movements occur further back in time or that their 
influence is felt indirectly through its effect on the Japanese market which in 
turn spills over on the U.K. market.10 
Turning to volatility spillovers experienced in the U.S. market, we find that the 
volatility spillover effect from the U.K. onto the U.S. market to be significant 
before October 1987, and increases during October 1987.n However, after the 
Crash, the spillover effect diminishes and falls below its pre-Crash level. In 
contrast, the Japanese market has an insignificant influence before and in the 
month of October 1987, but then acquires a significant positive effect 
thereafter. Figure 5 depicts the impulse response function of the U.S. market 
to Japanese price volatility surprises. The figure suggests an increase in the 
Japanese market's influence after the Crash. 
9
 It is noteworthy that the b and c parameter estimates in the conditional 
variance equation shown in Table 3 which allow for structural shift in the Crash 
month and beyond, are very similar in magnitude to the corresponding parameter 
estimates in Table 4 of Hamao-Masulis-Ng (1990) which specifies a stationary 
GARCH model using only pre-Crash data. This similarity and the insignificance 
of nearly all the parameters associated with the step functions indicate that the 
GARCH model does not appear to experience significant structural shifts after the 
Crash with the possible exception of the U.S. market. 
10
 This may be further caused by the overlap in London and New York trading 
periods. 
11
 The strength of this spillover effect may be exaggerated by the partially 
overlapping trading period in London and New York. It is also noteworthy that 
the volatility persistence in the U.S. market strengthens noticeably once we 
allow a shift in the GARCH process after the Crash. 
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Figure 5 
Impulse Response Function 
From Japan to U.S. 
The above results are consistent with our earlier study which document a 
pronounced, asymmetry in the transmission of volatility between Japan and the U.S. 
However, the current analysis which utilizes more recent data suggest a 
potentially important shift in these relationships subsequent to the 1987 Crash. 
We find that while the volatility spillover effect from the U.S. to Japan is 
consistently significant before, during and after the Crash, the volatility 
spillover effect from Japan to the U.S., though insignificant before and during 
the Crash period, increases to a possibly significant positive level in the post-
Crash period.12 
6. Time-Varying Spillover Effects 
The previous section documents that the volatility spillover effect exhibits 
significant shifts around the 1987 Crash. This leads us to question whether the 
volatility spillover effects actually exhibit a general time trend instead of a 
structural shift. In order to investigate this issue, we further modify our 
basic GARCH model to allow for a non-stochastic time trend in the volatility 
spillover variable which may be linear or non-linear as well as the step 
functions for the Crash and post-Crash periods as specified below: 
12
 This conclusion depends on whether or not one judges that the model 
residuals are significantly leptokurtic which would necessitate the use of robust 
standard errors. 
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where parameters m and s signify trends in spillover effects and 
m, s = 0 stationary spillover effect; 
m, s < —1 spillover effect decreasing at an increasing rate; 
—1 < m, s < 0 spillover effect decreasing at a decreasing rate; 
0 < m, s < 1 spillover effect increasing at a decreasing rate; and 
1 < m, s spillover effect increasing at an increasing rate. 
This formulation also allows us to examine whether the spillover effect exhibits 
a discrete jump after the Crash. The results of estimating the GARCH model as 
specified above are presented in Table 4. As in Table 3, the coefficients of 
kurtosis for the model residuals are not particularly high, indicating that the 
use of conventional t-statistics may be justified.13 The spillover effect from 
the U.S. market to Japan exhibits some upward trend which drops after the Crash. 
The spillover effect from the U.K. market to Japan exhibits a relatively large 
positive effect with an insignificant trend, but after October 1987 this effect 
declines. When we examine the U.K. market, we find no significant spillover 
effects from either the Japanese or U.S. markets. Turning to the U.S. market, 
we find no evidence of any trend in the spillover effect from the Japanese 
market, although there is evidence of a jump up in its level after the 1987 
Crash. In looking at volatility spillovers from the U.K. market, we find a 
positive effect on the U.S. market during the Crash month, but not before or 
after. The coefficients for dummy variables for during and after the Crash (g, 
k, q, and r) show qualitatively similar patterns as Table 3. 
While in most cases volatility spillover effects increase during the Crash period 
and then decline afterwards, the spillover effects from the Japanese market 
appear to be an exception. The spillover effects from the Japanese market to the 
U.S. market steadily increase over time, and experience a further jump in 
magnitude after the Crash period. One might attribute this change following the 
Crash to the increased awareness by U.S. investors of the importance of the 
Japanese economy to global economic conditions. 
7. Conclusions 
This study analyzes daily open-to-close returns from three major stock markets 
over the past five years, a period that includes the celebrated October 1987 
Stock Market Crash. We find that the international transmission of volatility 
13
 This is especially true when we take into account the fact that the 
sample period was explicitly chosen to include a period of abnormally large price 
changes. 
12 
does not occur evenly around the world; instead, there are spillover effects of 
disproportionate size from one market to the next. We also find that the 
volatility spillover effects have been relatively stable over our five year 
period even when we separate the Crash and post-Crash periods. The one major 
exception to this statement is that there is some weak evidence that volatility 
spillover effects emanating from Japan have been gathering strength over time, 
and these changes appear to be more pronounced, following the 1987 Crash. This 
latter evidence is weakly supportive of the proposition that domestic investors 
have become more aware of the growing economic interdependence of international 
financial markets and. the importance of Japanese financial developments for non-
Japanese markets, since the 1987 Crash. 
13 
Table 1. GARCH Estimation of Open-Close Returns: 
Sample period April 1, 1985 - February 28, 1990 
where ht represents the conditional variance of Rt the stock index return and Wt 
represents a dummy variable which takes a value of one on days following weekends 
and holidays and zero otherwise. 
14 
Table 2. Volatility Spillover Effects Estimated from a GARCH-M model 
where ht represents the conditional variance of Rt the stock index return, Wt 
represents a dummy variable which takes a value of one on days following weekends 
and holidays and zero otherwise, and Xifc is the most recent residual squared from 
model (1) for each foreign market. 
15 
Table 3. Volatility Spillover Effects Estimated from a GARCH(1,1)-M Model 
with Crash and Post Crash Dummies 
Rt - c + /Jht 4- «We + 7,t_1 + «t 
ht " a t + bht-l + C£t-1 + dWt + (f + S°C + ^ l t 
+ (p + qDt + rAt)X2t , 
where D - 1 if t is in October 1987 (during the Crash month), and 0 otherwise, 
and A = 1 if t is in the after-Crash period (November 1987 - February 1990), and 
0 otherwise. 
16 
Table 4. Time-Varying Volatility Spillover Effects Estimated from a 
GARCH(1,1)-M Model 
where D = 1 if t is in October 1987 (during the Crash month), and 0 otherwise, 
and A = 1 if t is in the after-Crash period (November 1987 - February 1990), and 
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